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Abstract
Modern global trading traffics large volumes of diverse products rapidly to a broad geographic area
of the world. When emergent infections enter this system in traded products their transmission is
amplified. With truly novel emergent infections with long incubation periods, such as Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or variant Creutzfeld Jacob Disease (vCJD), this transmission may
silently disseminate infection to far distant populations prior to detection. We describe the
chronology of two such "stealth infections," vCJD and HIV, and the production, processing, and
distribution changes that coincided with their emergence. The concept of "vector products" is
introduced. A brief case study of HIV incursion in Japan is presented in illustration. Careful
"multisectoral" analysis of such events can suggest ecologically critical pathways of emergence for
further research. Such analyses emphasize the urgency of implementing safety measures when
pathogens enter globally traded products.
Review
Introduction
The global trading system today speeds unprecedented
volumes of product to unparalleled numbers of markets
throughout the world. Coincident with its growth has
been the unwelcomed emergence and dissemination of
new infections in human populations. This article will
examine linkages between these two phenomena through
the optic of "stealth" infections – emergent infections
with long, silent incubation periods. When such patho-
gens are carried in a globally traded product (vector prod-
uct), spectacular geographic amplification can occur prior
to the onset of clinically recognizable illness. Examples of
these trade-related emerging infections caused by vector
products include variant Cruetzfeldt Jacob disease (vCJD)
and HIV/AIDS. Vector products can be defined as those
products that carry pathogens. It should be noted, how-
ever, that "vector" in infectious disease parlance usually
refers to living organisms, such as mosquitoes. The use of
the term here with regards to product is expedient, albeit
non-conforming to normative use.
The drivers for broad marketing of the "vector products"
in these two pandemics were 1) promotion and growth of
global demand for beef and animal feed and 2) promo-
tion and growth of global demand for human anticoagu-
lant factors for medical treatment. These market drivers
provoked a marked "ramping up" of production in pace
and capacity for the vector product. The production of
these vector products involved pooling of large amounts
of biological material. In each case novel pathogens
emerged and were disseminated over a broad geographic
area prior to their clinical detection.
Mad Cow Disease and vCJD
Global trade trends for the products implicated in the
transmission of HIV and vCJD reflect similar scales of
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increase in volume and dollar amounts during the decade
prior to the detection of human diseases.
The incubation period of vCJD is variable, estimated at up
to 15–30 years [1]. The incubation period of BSE (Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy), or mad cow disease, in cat-
tle is also on the order of years, which has complicated
culling interventions [2]. Mad cow disease was first
detected in British herds in 1986. Wide-scale trade embar-
goes did not occur until 2000, although some products,
such as bull semen, were embargoed as early as 1996,
when BSE was first linked to human vCJD [3].
In the case of beef and bone meal, the suspected source of
BSE, exports of the implicated product doubled in 1989,
from approximately 15,000 tons in 1988 to more than
30,000 tons (Figure 1) [4]. The surge in exports was at
least partly due to precautions taken as a result of concerns
about potential disease risk. Meat and bone meal (MBM),
a side product of animal slaughter, has long been appreci-
ated as a source of protein for animal feed. In fact, it is
speculated that BSE was introduced in cattle when scrapie-
infected material from sheep was pulverized into cattle
feed years ago [5]. Thus when BSE surfaced in the mid-
1980s, the UK banned the use of ruminant-derived meat
and bone meal in ruminant diets in 1988. However, the
feed was still permitted for non-ruminants. The ban
caused the price of the British MBM feed to drop, making
it more attractive for international trade. Once the feed-
stuffs moved through Europe, they were used for a variety
of purposes, including feed for ruminants; unlike in the
UK, in continental Europe, bone meal was a legal com-
modity for all animal feeds.
Meanwhile, the value of UK beef exports more than dou-
bled between 1985 and 1995 (Figure 2) [6]. A superficial
glance at the data would suggest a ramping up of produc-
tion; however, the UK beef industry, like most industries,
is more complex. In fact, as of 1995, the production of
beef in the UK had been static for two decades at about
UK Exports of Meat-and-Bone Meal, in tonnes, 1985 – 1991* Figure 1
UK Exports of Meat-and-Bone Meal, in tonnes, 1985 – 1991*. * legal for swine and poultry feed at the time; above scenario also 
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one million tons annually [7]. But consumption of beef in
the domestic market was declining, partly associated with
changing lifestyles. In 1980 Britons consumed 21.3 kg per
capita; in 1993 this fell to 17.0 kg per capita. In response,
consumer pricing for beef declined, while production and
distribution costs remained largely static. Consequently,
trade had, by 1995, become an important factor, repre-
senting 21 to 23 percent of the total market [7].
Prices fell both in response to declining domestic con-
sumption and the implementation of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) reforms, which
proposed liberalization of agricultural trade through
reduced border protection, domestic support payments
and export subsidization [7]. The GATT agreements com-
mitted economies to reduce tariffs on imports, and in
effect, there was price pressure to be competitive to keep
their market share at home, to become more efficient.
With margins in the supplying industries squeezed [7],
there was market pressure for consolidation of the previ-
ously fragmented production system. Farms of 50 cows or
more increased from 6,400 to 9,000 between 1986 and
1991.
These changes in processing may have permitted prions to
cross the species barrier from ruminant to human. Ren-
dering had been a "batch" procedure in Europe and North
America, relying on very high solvent extraction for the
production of tallow. In the 1970's, a continuous system
of rendering was introduced that relied on vacuum at rel-
atively low temperatures and produced high quality tal-
low. This efficient process saved costs to the industry. After
the BSE crisis, EU studies of abbattoir practices suggested
that the processes in place in the United Kingdom in the
1990's were ineffective in deactivating prions [8].
Amplification and Transmission through Trade
The geographic distribution of BSE is broad. If in fact the
emergence of this agent occurred only in Britain and bone
meal and animal feed contamination occurred only from
UK Beef Exports, in 1,000 U.S. Dollars, 1970 – 1999 Figure 2
UK Beef Exports, in 1,000 U.S. Dollars, 1970 – 1999. Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [6]Globalization and Health 2005, 1:3 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/1/1/3
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this source in the late 1980's it is impressive that OIE
(World Organisation for Animal Health) lists only four
countries currently confirmed as BSE-free [9]. By 2004, in
addition to the UK, 22 countries had notified the OIE of
cases of BSE in farmed cattle. Cases have been reported
largely in Europe but also in North America and Asia [9].
The UK may not in fact have been the sole origin, given a
recent report which suggests France had undetected BSE
epidemics on a large scale during the same time period
[10].
The BSE/vCJD emergence has also impacted the human
blood supply. Based on the experience with HIV/AIDS,
blood banks are concerned that an agent that cannot be
screened for may enter the global blood supply, amplify-
ing infectious transmission. This concern has been height-
ened by the occurrence of vCJD apparently related to
blood transfusion [11]. Thus exclusion criteria in the
United States and blood donation fractionation in the UK
reflect measures to mitigate this risk.
HIV/AIDS
By the end of 2003 UNAIDS estimated that almost 40 mil-
lion people were living with HIV/AIDS [12]. While
human sexual contact is the major global route of infec-
tion of HIV, the history of the pandemic also documents
the wide-ranging infection due to infected blood prod-
ucts. Again, innovations in product in response to a global
market were apparently correlated with amplification and
dissemination of product. In the early 1980's, when AIDS
was described in the first cluster of young gay men in San
Francisco, ongoing concern about the risk of hepatitis in
pooled blood for manufacture of blood factors had
spurred producers to a search for a means of screening
their product for hepatitis virus. However, viral deactiva-
tion processes were not generalized in the industry when
HIV emerged; with a profitable international market, the
new lyophilized blood product was globally traded.
The commercial sector for the production of blood factors
is most developed in the United States. Data from the U.S.
Census Bureau attests to a growing trade in blood product
from the mid-1970s to the late 1980's, from approxi-
mately 50 million USD in 1975 to 325 million USD in
1988. We now know that half of the hemophiliacs in the
U.S. were infected with HIV through this route, and an
untold number of hemophiliacs worldwide. In some
countries, such as Japan, this was probably the primary
route of entry into the population. By the end of the
1990's, there were 400 commercial centers for plas-
mapheresis operating in the U.S. These centers, which
employ paid donors, provided 60% of the worldwide
requirement for plasma [13].
By mid 1982 the possible link between AIDS and the
blood supply was reported in the CDC's Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report, and was widely known and
accepted the following year with the occurrence of cases in
hemophiliacs living in geographically dispersed areas. But
retooling the fast-growing industry of factor production
posed substantial difficulties, for several reasons. 1) The
science of HIV/AIDS disease was still early in its evolution,
and the data were not therefore clearcut 2) the plas-
mapheresis industry utilized largely compensated donors
(who were often higher risk for HIV/AIDS) as a basis for
obtaining plasma, 3) the most heavily impacted group,
homosexual males, were wary of discrimination in meas-
ures adopted. The initial self-exclusion strategies, for
example, did not ask donors about homosexual sexual
practice for fear of discrimination.
In early 1983 both the voluntary and commercial sectors
had taken some measures for reducing the participation of
high risk donors in plasmapheresis. But the Inquiry on the
Blood System in Canada, published by Health Canada's
Krever Commission in 1997, notes, "There is evidence,
however, that the voluntary sector refused to stop collect-
ing in high risk areas, though its blood donor recruiting
officials no longer targeted high risk individuals, and that
the commercial sector also continued to operate in such
areas" [13]. Viral inactivation methods had been in devel-
opment since the early 1970's to try to cut down on hep-
atitis transmission in blood. However, the industry
leaders considered such steps proprietary information for
production and so the work towards successful strategies
was not shared across the corporate competitors. In 1984
the major producers had all been licensed to distribute
heat-treated products to cut down on the threat of hepati-
tis and AIDS infection.
As with any product, blood products can be subject to a
recall, which is initiated when the public's health is at risk
due to contamination of the product. This option was
available to the US Food and Drug Administration as
soon as the risk of HIV transmission in blood factors
became known in March of 1983. An Institute of Medi-
cine study convened years later to review the history was
critical of the absence of a cogent, strong recall policy [14].
By 1985 the ELISA screening test for HIV came into use.
This, coupled with heat treatment of the factor product,
has markedly reduced the risk of HIV transmission in
blood. However, global spread of the virus, in part facili-
tated by the global trade in factor VIII, had already
occurred in the 1980's. This contributed to the profound
global reach of the epidemic seen today. The experience of
Japan illustrates this point.Globalization and Health 2005, 1:3 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/1/1/3
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Japan, Factor VIII and HIV/AIDS
In 1994, the Tenth International AIDS Conference was
held in Japan, focusing on subgroups, such as
hemophiliacs, that had previously received less attention
[15]. Although Japan had been characterized by some as
reluctant to acknowledge the introduction of HIV to Japan
via "sexual tourism," the virus did initially hit Japan
through the blood supply. According to the World Feder-
ation of Hemophilia, the majority of Japanese hemophil-
iacs are thought to have been affected during 1983–1985
by non-heat-treated factor concentrates imported from
the US. In fact, by 1985 the US provided 90 percent of
imported factor concentrates in Japan [13], and the Japa-
nese AIDS Research Group reported that the causative
agent of AIDS was found in factor VIII concentrates [13].
Of 5,000 hemophiliacs in Japan, approximately 2,000
had been infected with HIV/AIDS by 1997 according to
the Krever Report. The occurrence of HIV/AIDS through
factor concentrates became known in Japan as "Yakugai"
AIDS (meaning "AIDS due to the harmful effect of
medicine").
As factor concentrates were manufactured by pooling
plasma from many donors, the entire pool could be con-
taminated by a single unit from an HIV-infected donor.
Dr. Michael Rodell, former vice-president of the Armour
Pharmaceutical Company, estimated that four infected
persons could contaminate the entire world supply of fac-
tor VIII [13].
The Ministry of Health and Welfare in Japan regulates the
national blood system by licensing the use of blood prod-
ucts. In 1983 the Japanese AIDS Research Group, the cen-
tral technical group advising the Ministry on prevention
and control policy, reportedly considered a proposal from
the US fractionator Travenol to allow the importation of
heat-treated (virus-inactivated) factor VIII. At that time, a
new product could receive regulatory approval without
undergoing clinical trials if it could be classified as a
"change to manufacturing method having no effect on the
effective ingredients" [13].
The Ministry rejected the idea, apparently mistrusting the
reliability of the US FDA tests and fearing side-effects from
heat-treated concentrates [13]. Thus, while US reports in
1983 showed that HIV could be contracted from contam-
inated factor concentrates, the Ministry continued the
import of non-heat-treated factor concentrates, with the
stipulation that they be accompanied by a certificate that
they did not contain plasma from donors at high risk of
contracting HIV/AIDS [13]. The use of imported non-
heat-treated concentrates increased in 1984 and peaked in
1985 [13]. Although heat-treated factor concentrates were
approved for use in 1985 – because the Ministry recom-
mended that physicians continue to prescribe non-heat-
treated factor concentrates (and blood product manufac-
turers continued to distribute them without warning
labels about the risk of AIDS) – many hemophiliacs con-
tinued to use non-heat-treated concentrates through 1986
[13]. A further exacerbating problem was the fact that
some health care providers neglected to inform their
hemophiliac patients of their HIV infection, allowing
their sexual partners to become infected [16].
This tragedy in Japan was due to a combination of factors
in government, industries, and medical communities
[17]. The former chief of the Office of Biologics at the
Ministry of Health and Welfare, the head of the AIDS
Research Group, and three Green Cross executives were
indicted for misconduct and/or professional negligence.
Still, the "Yakugai AIDS" scandal is not over, and trials
continued through 2004.
Conclusion
The following similarities are thus apparent for infections
with very long incubation periods in the modern era of
trade and travel: 1) global forces such as market demand
or GATT provisions that favor increased exports also favor
consolidation, which may set the stage for streamlining
processing of product 2) such streamlining of production
for efficiency and cost savings may have a role in emer-
gence of new infections when biological materials are the
basis for product formulation 3) the emergence of new
pathogens that are disseminated through trade and travel
creates a "science gap" where rapid research is imperative
to find and implement agent-specific safety strategies
before extensive infection occurs 4) once clinical disease is
manifest widespread dissemination of infection has
occurred and risk can be mapped using product specific
trade data. This mapping may allow timely institution of
surveillance.
Among the most sobering lessons from these two emer-
gent diseases are the consequences of the division
between public and private science and the division
between the world of health and the world of trade. When
heat treatment processes were developed for factor VIII,
they were not shared across the industry in an expeditious
fashion. Urgent information on product risk and on safety
innovations is crucial to public safety and timely public
health intervention in disease.
The "sectors" of global trade and global health have few
working links. Information flow between the interna-
tional agencies, the World Trade Organization and World
Health Organization, while improving, is not routine. At
the regional and national level, intersectoral communica-
tions between the trade and health communities is also
troublesome. The European Union stands in contrast to
this generalization, with extensive collaboration in dis-Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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ease surveillance among its members [18]. The regional
initiatives on emerging infections of such regional trading
groups as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),
ASEAN and others are encouraging. At the national level,
formal collaboration between ministries of commerce
and health on product investigation or tracing is sparse.
British authorities were prescient in their implementation
of the "Offal Ban" in 1988 [19]. While the risk of vCJD
from BSE food animals was not established, they took pre-
cautionary measures to limit exposure which were, in ret-
rospect, prudent. At the same time, the issue of potential
"opportunistic exporting" of animal feed by the UK onto
the international market, in response to the bans imposed
domestically on such feed, has been raised. If precaution-
ary recall of factor VIII had been fully implemented in
1986, it is clear that hundreds of cases of HIV may have
been averted, and the geographic extent of human infec-
tion limited. Currently the costs and effectiveness of the
"precautionary principle" in commerce are under discus-
sion [20]. Accurate and complete description of these two
global emergent diseases (through mathematical mode-
ling and other research) will be important in informing
those discussions.
In summary, two novel infections with long incubation
periods, HIV/AIDS and BSE/vCJD, are illustrative in
describing the wide geographic dissemination and urgent
consequences of emergent infections associated with glo-
balized trade.
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